Epistemicism and modality by Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 2016
VOL. 46, NOS. 45, 803835
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1201878
 
 Epistemicism and modality 
 Juhani  Yli-Vakkuri 
 CSMN, University of Oslo ,  Oslo ,  Norway 
 ABSTRACT 
 What kind of semantics should someone who accepts the epistemicist theory of 
vagueness defended in Timothy Williamson’s  Vagueness (1994) give a defi niteness 
operator? To impose some interesting constraints on acceptable answers to this 
question, I will assume that the object language also contains a metaphysical 
necessity operator and a metaphysical actuality operator. I will suggest that the 
answer is to be found by working within a three-dimensional model theory. I will 
provide sketches of two ways of extracting an epistemicist semantics from that 
model theory, one of which I will fi nd to be more plausible than the other. 
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 What kind of semantics should someone who accepts the epistemicist theory 
of vagueness defended in Timothy Williamson’s  Vagueness give a defi niteness 
operator? To impose some interesting constraints on acceptable answers to this 
question, I will assume that the object language also contains a metaphysical 
necessity operator and a metaphysical actuality operator. The question, then, 
concerns the semantics of the interaction of vagueness, as expressed by ‘defi -
nitely,’ and metaphysical modality, as expressed by ‘necessarily’ and ‘actually,’ 
from an epistemicist point of view. I will argue that the kind of two-dimensional 
(2D) semantics standardly used for investigating the interaction of ‘necessar-
ily’ and ‘actually’ cannot handle the three-way interaction between these and 
‘defi nitely,’ given epistemicism (or indeed supervaluationism). I will suggest that 
the answer is to be found by working within the three-dimensional (3D) model 
theory I have developed with Jon Litland. I will provide sketches of two ways 
of extracting an epistemicist semantics from that model theory, one of which I 
will fi nd to be more plausible than the other. 
 ©  2016  Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
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 1. According to the epistemicist theory of vagueness ( epistemicism ) defended 
by Williamson ( 1994 ), our ignorance of borderline matters — such as of how 
many grains of sand it takes to make a heap — has a special source, and that 
source of ignorance or, perhaps better put, that obstacle to knowledge, is all 
there is to vagueness. For it to be borderline, whether  S is simply for there to 
be a special kind of obstacle to us (and to creatures relevantly like us) know-
ing whether  S . Williamson’s account of this obstacle to knowledge famously 
makes use of the thesis that, whenever it is borderline whether  S , the sentence 
‘ S ’ is, to use John Hawthorne’s term, 1   semantically plastic in that, if the global 
patterns of use involving some of the words occurring in ‘ S ’ had been ever so 
slightly diff erent in certain ways, then ‘ S ’ would have had a semantic value dif-
ferent from its actual semantic value. (I will henceforth refer to this thesis as 
 Semantic Plasticity .) The rough idea of the explanation is that we are insensitive 
in our judgments to the ways in which certain slight diff erences in global pat-
terns of language use make a diff erence to the semantic values of sentences, 
and this insensitivity explains why we are not in a position to know whether  S 
whenever it is borderline whether  S . The semantic values that the borderline 
sentence ‘ S ’ could easily have had had the global patterns of use of some of the 
words occurring in ‘ S ’ been ever so slightly diff erent in certain ways include both 
true and false semantic values. This, in turn, gives rise to close possibilities of 
error — possibilities that are ‘close’ in a sense that matters to knowledge, and 
that are therefore incompatible with knowing whether  S . 
 Epistemicism appears to be the simplest and most conservative theory of 
vagueness on off er. Its main advertised virtues are that it enables us to keep 
classical logic and a disquotational conception of truth, 2  and that, ‘[a]t least in its 
simplest form, epistemicism can take over and reinterpret the formal apparatus 
of supervaluationism,’ 3  thereby using the familiar formal apparatus of possi-
ble-worlds model theory to investigate the logic and semantics of the operators 
we use for theorizing about vagueness: in the fi rst instance, the defi niteness 
operator, in terms of which the notion of a borderline case can be defi ned. (It 
is borderline whether  S iff  it is neither defi nite that  S nor defi nite that it is not 
the case that  S. ) 4  
 From the beginning, epistemicism faced the incredulous stare. During the 
fi rst decade or so since the publication of  Vagueness , there seemed to be a broad 
consensus that the choice epistemicism presented us with was one between 
some kind of intuitive plausibility (which it lacked) and theoretical virtues (which 
it did not). 5  Recently, however, epistemicism’s theoretical bona fi des have been 
called into question. Since 2006, certain philosophers — in particular, John 
Hawthorne, Ofra Magidor, Stephen Kearns, and Michael Caie 6  — have begun 
to engage with the details of Williamson’s proposal. In doing so they have dis-
covered what appear to be quite serious problems with the proposed account of 
ignorance of borderline matters in terms of Semantic Plasticity, with epistemicist 
interpretations of supervaluationism’s formal (model-theoretic) apparatus, and 
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with the compatibility of these with a commitment to disquotational truth. So 
far, these challenges have gone unanswered. This paper represents a start — but 
only a start — in attempting to answer them. 
 I should warn the reader immediately that no review of the recent literature 
will be provided, although some points of contact with the papers cited above 
will be noted. I will largely be concerned with challenges to the Williamsonian 
epistemicist package that are diff erent from, although closely related to, those 
discussed in the recent critical literature. The main problem I will be dealing 
with is that of giving an epistemicist semantics for a language that contains a 
defi niteness operator alongside a metaphysical necessity operator and a meta-
physical actuality operator. The diffi  culties one faces in attempting to carry out 
this task parallel in various ways the diffi  culties Williamson’s recent critics have 
noticed. This is not particularly surprising, because the critics, with the exception 
of Caie, set up their problems using the metalinguistic notion of a sentence 
(or a sentence in a context, or an utterance of a sentence) being borderline, 
as opposed to an object language borderline operator (which is defi nable in 
terms of a defi niteness operator, as indicated above). These are related to each 
other in obvious ways: in particular, in that the sentence ‘ S ’ is borderline iff  it is 
borderline whether  S . Diff erent issues arise when the borderline (or defi niteness) 
operator occurs within the scope of a modal operator, but many of the problems 
discussed in this paper do not essentially involve such embeddings. 
 2. Let us return to Semantic Plasticity. My description in  Section 1 of Williamson’s 
explanation of ignorance of borderline matters in terms of Semantic Plasticity 
was deliberately vague (in the ordinary sense). This is because much in the recent 
literature and in this paper turns on just what the correct account of ignorance 
of borderline matters in terms of Semantic Plasticity is, if indeed there is one. For 
example, I left it open whether the kind of sentential semantic value mentioned 
in Semantic Plasticity is a proposition or something else. But we can begin with 
the assumption that propositions are the relevant kind of semantic value, since 
they clearly play that role in Williamson’s own expositions of his explanation 
of ignorance of borderline matters. 7  If there is to be an explanation in terms 
of Semantic Plasticity of why we cannot know whether  S when it is borderline 
whether  S , that explanation must posit close worlds in which ‘ S ’ expresses a false 
proposition, as well as close worlds in which ‘ S ’ expresses a true proposition. Only 
close possibilities of error are incompatible with knowledge; close non-actual 
possibilities in which one judges something that is merely actually false are not, 
and neither are actual possibilities in which one judges something that is merely 
counterfactually false. On the other hand, the relevant possibilities of error must 
match actuality in certain respects: the existence of a close world in which, e.g. 
‘Tim is thin’ expresses a false proposition other than the proposition it actually 
expresses and in which Tim’s precise physical measurements are diff erent than 
they actually are may be incompatible with one’s knowing that Tim is thin, but 
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it is not an example of the kind of obstacle to knowledge presented by vague-
ness. Much of the recent critical literature can be read as suggesting that these 
two demands on an explanation of ignorance of borderline matters in terms of 
Semantic Plasticity are diffi  cult to reconcile with each other and with the other 
commitments of Williamson’s epistemicism: in particular with disquotational 
truth and an epistemicist reinterpretation of supervaluationism’s model-theo-
retic apparatus. In fact, Caie appears to think that the two commitments force 
a dilemma on Williamson’s kind of epistemicism, both forks of which lead to 
clearly incorrect conclusions about what is borderline. 
 One way of throwing the diffi  culties I have just gestured at into particularly 
sharp relief is to ask what kind of a semantics someone committed Williamson’s 
kind of epistemicism should give a defi niteness operator. I will pursue this line 
of inquiry, and I will take Caie’s recent discussion as my starting point, although 
his discussion, unlike mine, is not conducted in an explicitly model-theoretic 
framework. My discussion will also diff er from Caie’s (among other respects) in 
that I will ask not only what kind of semantics the epistemicist should give a defi -
niteness operator — which I’ll designate by ‘ △ ’ — but a defi niteness operator in 
combination with a metaphysical necessity (✷) and actuality ( A ) operator. It will 
turn out that the inclusion of ✷ and  A in the object language makes it possible 
to produce reasonably snappy counterexamples to certain semantic proposals 
that would otherwise require more elaborate counterexamples. 
 3. Let us begin by drawing a distinction between a  model theory and a  semantics . 
 A  semantics for a language, as I will use the term in this paper, is an appropri-
ately informative specifi cation, in a metalanguage, of the function that assigns 
to each sentence of the language, in each context of utterance, the proposition 
the sentence expresses in that context. I will assume that propositions are (or 
are represented by — a distinction of which I will not be making heavy weather) 
functions from metaphysically possible worlds to truth values. In particular, I will 
assume that a proposition  p is the function that assigns truth to a world  w if  p is 
true in  w and otherwise assigns falsehood to  w . (I make this assumption in order 
to simplify the discussion: nothing in this paper turns on whether propositions 
are more fi ne-grained than this.) When dealing with a suitably simple language 
— as in this paper — we can assume that contexts of utterance are also nothing 
more than metaphysically possible worlds. Metaphysically possible worlds (or 
simply ‘worlds’), then, play two roles in a semantics: the role of contexts and the 
role of the entities with respect to which propositions are evaluated for truth. 
I will follow one standard nomenclature (that of Kaplan  1977 ) in calling worlds 
 circumstances when they play the second role. A semantics for a language, then, 
is an appropriately informative specifi cation of a function from the sentences 
of the language to functions from contexts to functions from circumstances to 
truth values. Equivalently, we can think of a semantics for a language as asso-
ciating each of its sentences ϕ with a two-dimensional semantic value that is 
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its  total semantic profi le : a set  P of ordered pairs of worlds such that 〈 w ,  v 〉 ෛ  P iff  
the proposition ϕ expresses in  w is true in  v . 
 Three further remarks about the present conception of a semantics are in 
order. 
 First, we will have to think of at least some semantic features of the expres-
sions of the object language as being fi xed independently of context. At least 
we will have to assume that the conventional meanings — in Kaplanian terms, 
 characters — of the logical constants, which in the present setting are  △ , ✷, 
 A , and the truth-functional connectives, do not vary with context. 8  Thus, for 
example, we assume that, for any context  w , the proposition ¬ϕ expresses in  w 
will be true in a circumstance iff  the proposition ϕ expresses in  w is false in that 
circumstance, regardless of how (and whether) the expression ¬ is used in  w . I’ll 
leave it an open question what else is fi xed. In various other settings it would be 
natural to follow Kaplan in assuming that the characters of all object language 
expressions are fi xed independently of context. If we did so, we should think 
of the total semantic profi le of a sentence as simply being (or representing) its 
character. However, certain peculiar features of the task of giving a semantics 
for a language containing  △ might be thought to rule out this assumption, so I 
won’t make it. I will return to this theme in Section 4. 
 Second, it will have to be decided what the proposition expressed by ϕ in 
 w is when ϕ is not used in  w . We will have to resolve to use the term ‘expresses’ 
in a technical sense according to which the proposition an atomic sentence ϕ 
expresses in  w , in the technical sense, when ϕ is used in  w , is the proposition ϕ 
expresses in  w in the ordinary sense, but the proposition an atomic sentence 
ϕ expresses in  w , in the technical sense, when ϕ is not used in  w , is something 
else — for example, it might be the proposition that is false in every world. (For 
non-atomic sentences the proposition is determined by the recursion clauses 
of the semantics.) 9  It makes no diff erence how this question is decided, so I 
won’t decide it. 
 (A related idealization: I assume that, when ϕ  is used in  w , ϕ expresses a 
unique proposition in  w . Thus, I idealize away,  inter alia , ambiguity, semantically 
defective uses of sentences, and dimensions of indexicality other than sensitivity 
to the world of the context.) 
 Third, a semantics may, and in almost any interesting case will, do more 
than give an appropriately informative description of the total semantic profi le 
of each sentence of the object language. It is a natural and widely endorsed 
methodological precept (which is, however, rarely observed in practice 10  ) that 
a semantics should specify an assignment of semantic values to sentences in 
a way that is, in the standard sense of the word,  compositional , and that these 
semantic values either are or determine the sentences’ total semantic profi les. 
Often the compositional semantic values can only determine, rather than be, 
the total semantic profi les. And this is how things go, as we will see, with a lan-
guage containing  △,✷ , and  A , when  △ is given an epistemicist interpretation: 
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the compositional semantic values of its sentences must be three-dimensional 
rather than two-dimensional. (This is also true of supervaluationist-friendly 
semantics for  △,✷ , and  A : see Litland and Yli-Vakkuri,  2016 .) But in such cases 
we can assume that each context supplies a unique value for each parameter, 
and we can still take the total semantic profi le of a sentence to be a set of 
ordered pairs of contexts and circumstances, since the contexts in such pairs 
will determine values for all of the parameters that it takes to assign a sentence 
a unique truth value at each circumstance. 
 A  model theory , on the other hand, is a defi nition of a relation designated as 
 truth in a model , or, in the cases that will interest us,  truth at a point of evaluation 
in a model , supplemented by two further defi nitions: a  model is defi ned as a 
certain kind of set, and a relation ๻ of  logical consequence is defi ned as (e.g.) 
truth-preservation at every (proper) point of evaluation of every model. These 
defi nitions supplement some background set theory — ZFC, say — so that 
anything proved by means of them will be a theorem of that set theory. Among 
the interesting claims that might be proved or disproved in this way is that the 
set of sentences designated as  valid (i.e. the logical consequences of the empty 
set) is recursively axiomatizable (‘completeness’). Such results may be interesting 
on their own, even if no bridge principles are supplied to connect the model 
theory to a semantics in the above sense — or to semantics in any natural sense. 
 The development of a model theory, however, is typically guided by a seman-
tic picture, in a broader sense of ‘semantic.’ The broadest contours of such a 
picture are often the following. A model is (or represents) a way of interpret-
ing, in some sense, all of the non-logical expressions of the object language. 
Furthermore, when models provide points of evaluation, but do not provide a 
privileged ‘actual’ point, 11  the ‘proper’ points of evaluation are naturally taken 
to be (or represent) contexts. Logical consequence, then, is truth-preservation 
in all contexts under all ways of interpreting the object language’s non-logical 
expressions. 
 If we assume this broad-outlines picture, as I will do, we can go on to ask 
questions about the model that is (or represents) the actual or correct inter-
pretation of the non-logical expressions of the object language — the  intended 
model , as it is usually called. If the models come with representatives of contexts 
as well as circumstances, then a suitable specifi cation of the intended model 
will be a semantics. 12  
 The standard approach to the model theory of languages with  △ is that asso-
ciated with supervaluationism. 13  In the simplest case, where we are dealing with 
a propositional language whose only non-truth-functional logical operator is 
 △ , a supervaluationist model is a creature familiar from texts on modal logic: a 
triple  픘  = 〈 W ,  R , ⟦.⟧〉, where  W is a non-empty set (of ‘valuations’),  R a refl exive 
relation on  W (perhaps satisfying some further conditions), and ⟦.⟧ a function 
from the atomic sentences to subsets of  W . An atomic sentence ϕ is defi ned as 
true in  픘 at  w  ෛ  W iff   w  ෛ ⟦ϕ⟧; we have the usual truth defi nition clauses for the 
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truth-functional connectives; and  △ ϕ is defi ned as true in  픘 at  w  ෛ  W iff , for all  v 
such that  wRv , ϕ is true in  픘 at  v . Logical consequence can be defi ned in several 
ways, which will not be of interest here. The question I want to ask, rather, is this: 
how, if at all, could we extract an  epistemicist semantics for a language with  △ 
from the supervaluationist’s model theory? 
 Some remarks by Williamson suggest optimism on this score:
 At least in its simplest form, epistemicism can take over and reinterpret the formal 
apparatus of supervaluationism, with a Tarskian conception of truth. To say that 
a valuation  V * is admissible by [ R -related to] a valuation  V is now to say that  V * is 
indiscriminable from  V in the sense indicated. (Williamson  2003 , 710) 
 On one natural way of extrapolating an epistemicist semantics from these 
remarks,  △ , as used in a given world  w , is, in eff ect, a device for generalizing over 
assignments of propositions- cum -semantic-values to sentences that obtain in 
worlds that are  close to  w in such a way that global patterns of the use of lan-
guage that obtain in them diff er from those obtaining in  w at most in such minor 
ways that we are insensitive to any diff erences these diff erences in use may make 
to semantic value — insensitive, furthermore, in a way that makes the semantic 
value assignment that obtains in any world close to  w indiscriminable (to crea-
tures like us) from the semantic value assignment that obtains in  w . Caie ( 2012 ) 
uses the term ‘semantic indiscriminability’ for this kind of closeness, and I will 
adopt his term: I will assume, for now, that two worlds are close to each other in 
the sense relevant to an epistemicist interpretation of  △ iff  they are semantically 
indiscriminable from each other in the rough-and-ready sense just indicated. 
 (Note that the supervaluationist’s models, as described above, do not contain 
any representatives of propositions: they simply assign truth values to atomic 
sentences relative to valuations. It is, however, natural to think of the valuations 
as representing ways of assigning propositions to atomic sentences, and to think 
of the truth value of an atomic sentence ϕ relative to a valuation  v as the truth 
value determined by the proposition ϕ expresses relative to  v .) 
 Caie, however, is not optimistic that anything like the above sketch can be 
developed into a satisfactory epistemicist semantics for  △ . In fact, Caie goes as 
far as to suggest that the diffi  culties he encounters in attempting to extrapolate 
an epistemicist semantics for  △ from the quoted remarks by Williamson support 
the conclusion that ‘one cannot provide an adequate account of what it is for a 
case to be borderline by appealing to facts about our inability to discriminate 
our actual situation from nearby counterfactual situations in which our language 
use diff ers in subtle ways.’ 14  
 Let us see, then, why Caie thinks this. 
 Caie observes that there appear to be two inequivalent accounts of what it 
takes for  △ ϕ to be true in a world (considered as a context, I assume) that are con-
sistent with Williamson’s account of ignorance of borderline matters. According 
to the account Caie calls ‘otherworldly,’  △ ϕ is true in a world  w (considered as a 
context) iff , for every world  v close to  w , the proposition- cum -semantic value 
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ϕ has or expresses in  v (considered as a context) is true in  v (considered as a 
circumstance). According to the other account, which Caie calls ‘actualistic,’  △ ϕ 
is true in a world  w (considered as a context) iff , for every world  v close to  w , the 
proposition- cum -semantic value ϕ has or expresses in  v (considered as a context) 
is true in  w (considered as a circumstance). Caie claims that both answers ‘face 
crippling defects.’ 15  
 One thing to note about Caie’s otherworldly and actualistic accounts is that 
neither provides enough information for a semantics for a language with  △ , 
even against a background theory that specifi es the total semantic profi le of 
every sentence containing no occurrences of  △ . Each account only purports to 
say what it takes for  △ ϕ to be true in a single world  w — considered as a context, 
I have assumed — which is to say, what it takes for the proposition expressed 
by  △ ϕ in a given world to be true  in that world . This is not enough to specify the 
proposition expressed by  △ ϕ in any context. Now, of course, if Caie is right that 
absurd consequences follow from the what the actualistic and otherworldly 
accounts say about what it takes for the proposition expressed by  △ ϕ in a world 
to be true in that same world, then there is no need to consider separately 
the semantic proposals consistent with them which specify what it takes for 
the proposition expressed by  △ ϕ in one world to be true in an arbitrary world. 
However, I do not fi nd Caie’s arguments against the otherworldly and actualistic 
accounts entirely decisive, 16  and I think we can learn something by regimenting 
Caie’s two options using standard model-theoretic resources. In fact, as prom-
ised, I will consider not only what an epistemicist would have to say about the 
semantics of  △ , but also of its interaction with ✷ and  A , if the semantic options 
are limited to those consistent with the otherworldly and actualistic options. 
 4. Let  L VM  be a propositional language with an infi nite stock of atomic sentences, 
the usual truth-functional connectives, with ¬ and ෺ taken as primitive, ✷ (‘nec-
essarily’),  A (‘actually’), and  △ (‘defi nitely’), and no other logical constants, with 
the usual formation rules and metalinguistic abbreviations. Thus, in particular, 
‘✸ϕ’ abbreviates ‘¬✷¬ϕ’ and ‘ ▿ ϕ’ abbreviates ‘¬ △ ϕ ෺ ¬ △ ¬ϕ.’ Let  L M  be the language 
that results from dropping  △ from  L VM  .  L VM  is the language whose semantics 
this paper will, for the most part, be concerned with. Languages with greater 
expressive resources will also be briefl y considered. 
 The standard model-theoretic treatment of  L M  is two-dimensional: it inter-
prets sentences as sets of two-dimensional points of evaluation drawn from the 
Cartesian product of a non-empty set  W and itself. In what follows I will depart 
from that standard treatment by including in each model an ‘accessibility’ rela-
tion  R which is  not used for interpreting ✷; rather,  R will later be used, just as in 
supervaluationist model theory, for interpreting  △ in  L VM  , so  R will be idle as far 
as the treatment of  L M  is concerned. 
 So let us say that a  2D model is a triple  픘  = 〈 W ,   R , ⟦.⟧〉, where  W is a non-
empty set,  R a refl exive and symmetric relation on  W , and ⟦.⟧ a function from the 
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atomic sentences of  L M  (which are also the atomic sentences of  L VM  ) to subsets of 
 W  ×  W . The truth value |ϕ|  픘w,v  ෛ {0, 1} of an  L M  -sentence ϕ at a point of evaluation 
〈 w ,  v 〉 ෛ  W  ×  W in  픘 is defi ned as follows, where α is any atomic sentence and ϕ 
and ψ are any sentences. 
 (i)  |α|픘w,v = 1 iff  〈 w ,  v 〉 ෛ ⟦α⟧ 
 (ii)  |¬ ϕ  |픘w,v = 1 iff  |ϕ| 
픘
w,v  = 0 
 (iii)  |ϕ෺ψ  |픘w,v = 1 iff  both |ϕ| 픘w,v = 1  and |ψ| 픘w,v = 1 
 (iv)  |✷ ϕ  |픘w,v = 1 iff  for all  u  ෛ  W , |ϕ| 픘w,u = 1 
 (v)  |A ϕ | 픘w,v = 1 iff  |ϕ| 픘w,w = 1 
 Let’s say that a point of evaluation is  proper iff  it is of the form 〈 w ,  w 〉, and that 
ϕ is  true in w in  픘 (|ϕ  |픘w = 1 ) iff  ϕ is true at the proper point of  w , i.e. at 〈 w ,  w 〉, in 
 픘 . Logical consequence is defi ned as truth-preservation at every proper point 
of evaluation of every model: that is to say, for any set of sentences Γ and any 
sentence ϕ, Γ ๻ ϕ iff , for all models  픘  = 〈 W ,  R , ⟦.⟧〉 and all  w  ෛ  W , |ϕ  |픘w = 1 if, for 
all γ ෛ Γ,  |γ|픘w = 1 . And a sentence ϕ is said to be valid (๻ϕ), as usual, iff  it is a 
consequence of the empty set. 
 (Below I will tend to drop the model superscript from the expressions ‘|ϕ  |픘w,v ’
and ‘|ϕ  |픘w ,’ writing simply ‘|ϕ| w , v ’ or ‘|ϕ| w  ,’ when it is clear from the context what 
generalization over models is meant or which model is being referred to .) 
 The above defi nitions give us the logic of ‘real-world validity.’ 17  The distinctive 
feature of this logic is that the principle of Necessitation (if ๻ϕ then ๻✷ϕ) fails. 
For example, ϕ ิ  A ϕ is true at every proper point of evaluation of every model, 
so is valid, but whenever ¬✷ϕ ෺ ¬✷¬ϕ is true at a proper point in a model, 
✷(ϕ ิ  A ϕ) is false at that point in that model, so is not valid. 
 The extraction of a semantics for  L M  from the 2D model theory, according 
to the standard view, which we largely owe to Kaplan ( 1977 ), proceeds in a 
straightforward way. The idea is that, in the intended model,  W is the set of all 
metaphysically possible worlds, and the worlds in a point of evaluation 〈 w ,  v 〉 
play the two roles described in Section 3:  w is a context, and  v is a circumstance. 
|ϕ| w , v  = 1 iff  ϕ is true at 〈 w ,  v 〉 in the sense of Section 3: i.e. iff  the proposition ϕ 
expresses in the context  w is true in the circumstance  v . 18  Thus, the proposition 
expressed by ϕ in the context  w is the function λ v |ϕ| w , v . Since ϕ is true  simpliciter 
iff  the proposition ϕ actually expresses is actually true, ϕ is true  simpliciter iff  
|ϕ| @   = 1, i.e. iff  |ϕ| @ , @  = 1, where ‘@’ is used, as usual, as a name for the actual world. 
 It’s worth noting — to return to a theme from Section 3 — that the particular 
version of this semantics that is favored by Kaplan will not do for epistemicist (or, 
indeed, supervaluationist) applications. According to the orthodox Kaplanian 
version, the function λ w λ v |ϕ| w , v  is the character of ϕ. This would have the con-
sequence that no sentence with a constant character that determines, in every 
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context, the same non-contingent proposition is borderline. For suppose that ϕ 
is such a sentence. Then ϕ has the same truth value at every point of evaluation, 
and consequently  △ ϕ ෻  △ ¬ϕ is true at every point. But this is clearly wrong. A 
sentence with a constant character that expresses, in every context, the same 
non-contingent proposition could easily be borderline. For example, there are 
vague identity sentences with proper names fl anking the identity predicate. 
Suppose, for example, that it is borderline whether  S and that we introduce the 
name ‘ N ’ with the stipulation that ‘ N ’ refers to Kit Fine if  S and to Tim Williamson 
otherwise; 19  then it will be borderline whether  N  = Kit, and it will be borderline 
whether  N  = Tim. However, given the standard assumptions that names are rigid 
designators in the sense of Kripke ( 1980 ) and are not indexicals, the sentences 
‘ N  = Kit’ and ‘ N  = Tim’ will have constant characters each of which determines, 
in each context, the same non-contingent proposition. 20  
 Now let us turn to  L VM  . To extend the above model theory to deal with  L VM  , 
we will have to add a clause for  △ to the defi nition of truth at a point in a model. 
If we restrict our options to clauses that are compatible with one or another 
of Caie’s otherworldly and actualistic accounts of the truth of  △ ϕ at a proper 
point, we have four options. The otherworldly account is consistent with each 
of the following. 
 (O 1 )  |△ ϕ  |
픘
w,v = 1 iff , for all  u such that  vRu , |ϕ  |
픘
u,u = 1 . 
 (O 2 )  |△ ϕ  |
픘
w,v = 1 iff , for all  u such that  wRu , |ϕ  |
픘
u,u = 1 . 
 And the actualistic account is consistent with each of the following. 
 (A 1 )  |△ ϕ  |
픘
w,v = 1 iff , for all  u such that  vRu , |ϕ|  
픘
u,v = 1 . 
 (A 2 )  |△ ϕ  |
픘
w,v = 1 iff , for all  u such that  wRu , |ϕ|  
픘
u,v = 1 . 
 Each of these proposals is unacceptable  qua semantics.  Qua model theory, 
each proposal, it will turn out, results in an unacceptable logic: each either vali-
dates some sentences that should not be validated or fails to validate some that 
should be. And in each case the logical fl aw is closely related to a semantic fl aw. 
 To begin, one serious logical shortcoming of (O 1 ) is that it fails to validate 
 ✷(△ ϕ  ⊃ ϕ) — the principle that, necessarily, whatever is defi nitely so is so. By 
(O 1 ),  ✷(△ ϕ  ⊃ ϕ) is false at a world  w in a model just in case, for some world  v of 
the model, |ϕ| w , v  = 0, while, for all worlds  u such that  vRu , |ϕ| u , u  = 1, and clearly 
there are models with worlds satisfying this condition. 
 Now a failure to validate something that should be validated does not imme-
diately show that the model theory cannot deliver a correct semantics; for that 
it would also have to say some false things about the intended model. (Cf. if we 
let the interpretation of ¬ vary from model to model we would fail to validate 
every truth-functional tautology, 21  but this would not necessarily portend any 
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trouble with the semantics, since it would be consistent with ¬ being interpreted 
as negation in the intended model.) However, it is easy enough to see that the 
actual world of the intended model must witness the invalidity of  ✷(△ ϕ  ⊃ ϕ) if 
(O 1 ) is correct, and this is why (O 1 ) is not acceptable for semantic purposes. For 
example, let ϕ be the sentence ‘Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus.’ In the actual world of 
the intended model — that is, actually — the proposition ϕ expresses is false 
in every world. However, in some other world, ϕ expresses a proposition that 
is true in every world. (Any world in which ‘≠’ means what it actually means 
and ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ refer to distinct planets in spite of their ref-
erence being fi xed in the manner it actually is is such a world.) It follows that 
 ✷(△ ϕ  ⊃ ϕ) is false. But  ✷(△ ϕ  ⊃ ϕ) says that it is necessary that if it is defi nite that 
Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus then Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus, which is clearly true, so 
 ✷(△ ϕ  ⊃ ϕ) is true, contrary to (O 1 ). 
 (O 2 ) also does not validate  ✷(△ ϕ  ⊃ ϕ), and this portends trouble for its seman-
tic applications. However, (O 2 ) has an even more serious problem that: it vali-
dates  ✷△ ϕ ෻ ✷¬ △ ϕ. This is immediately disqualifying, because validity entails 
truth. It is often a contingent matter what is defi nitely so. For example, I could 
have been defi nitely a pastry chef, and I could have been — because I am — 
defi nitely not a pastry chef. 
 Like (O 1 ), (A 1 ) fails to validate  ✷(△ ϕ  ⊃ ϕ), and, as in the case of (O 1 ), this log-
ical failure is accompanied by a semantic failure. By (A 1 ),  ✷(△ ϕ  ⊃ ϕ)) is false at 
any world  w in any model with a world  v such that |ϕ| w , v  = 0, for all  u such 
that  vRu , |ϕ| u , v  = 1, and clearly there are models satisfying this condition. Now 
consider the intended model. As in the discussion of (O 1 ), we can let ϕ be 
‘Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus.’  Then, in the actual world of the intended model — i.e. 
actually — ϕ expresses a proposition that is false in every world. Thus, if there is 
also a world  w such that, in every world close to  w , ϕ expresses a proposition that 
is false in  w ,  ✷(△ ϕ  ⊃  ϕ) is false. And, clearly that there is such a world. Consider the 
fact that, if ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ had referred to diff erent objects, ϕ would 
have expressed the same proposition — the necessary one — in every close 
world, and that proposition, being the necessary one, would have been true. 
Thus (since ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ could have referred to diff erent objects), 
there is a world  w such that, in every world close to  w , ϕ expresses a proposition 
that is true in  w . Again, we reach the absurd conclusion that  ✷(△ ϕ   ⊃  ϕ) — which 
says that it is necessary that if it is defi nite that Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus then 
Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus — is false. 
 Finally, while (A 2 ) does validate  ✷(△ ϕ   ⊃ ϕ), it suff ers from another logical fl aw, 
which it shares with (A 1 ): it violates the principle I call  Defi nitization , namely: 
 If ๻ ϕ, then ๻△ϕ. 
 Defi nitization says, in eff ect, that each valid sentence is (validly) defi nite. The 
models that are counterexamples to Defi nitization under (A 2 ) also turn out to 
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include the intended model, and this dooms (A 2 ) as a semantic proposal. ϕ ิ   A ϕ 
is true at every proper point of every model, but, by (A 2 ), in any model, 
  | △ (ϕ ิ  A ϕ)| w   = 0 iff  for some  v such that  wRv , |ϕ ิ  A ϕ| v , w  = 0 
  iff  for some  v such that  wRv , |ϕ| v , w  ≠ | A ϕ| v , w  
  iff  for some  v such that  wRv , |ϕ| v , w  ≠ |ϕ| v , v  
 For any sentence ϕ, then,  ▿ (ϕ ิ   A ϕ) is true iff  ϕ expresses, in some world  w 
R -related to the actual world, a proposition that has diff erent truth values in 
 w and in the actual world. And, it is reasonably clear that there are sentences 
that satisfy this condition, at least according to Williamson ( 1994 ): the worlds 
close to the actual world diff er from the actual world with respect to various 
semantic states of aff airs, and, provided that the semantic supervenes on the 
non-semantic, also with respect to various non-semantic states of aff airs. If ϕ 
expresses some such state of aff airs (proposition) both actually and in some 
close world, then  ▿ (ϕ ิ   A ϕ) is true. But this is absurd: we are in a position to know 
ϕ ิ  A ϕ to be true, no matter what sentence ϕ might be, so, because borderline 
matters are unknowable, ϕ ิ  A ϕ is not borderline. 
 In my view the above considerations are decisive against both of the oth-
erworldy and both of the actualistic semantics for  △ . There are, however, other 
ways of arguing against each option — ways that do not discriminate between 
(O 1 ) and (O 2 ), or between (A 1 ) and (A 2 ) — which it may be instructive to survey. 
 To begin with the otherworldly semantics, these share a fl aw that can be 
leveraged to produce a variety of counterexamples. The shared fl aw is the fol-
lowing. On any reasonable view of vagueness, not just Williamson’s, it is not 
suffi  cient for it to be borderline whether  S that it could have (easily or oth-
erwise) not been the case that  S . The actualistic semantics get this right; the 
otherworldly ones do not. 22  
 One way to appreciate this fl aw is to note that, according to the otherworldly 
semantics, a certain kind of metaphysical contingency is suffi  cient for border-
lineness: if ϕ expresses the same proposition in all close worlds, and this propo-
sition is contingent in such a way that it is true in some and false in other close 
worlds, then  ▿ ϕ is true according to the otherworldly semantics. This is clearly 
wrong from the point of view of just about anyone’s theory of vagueness. It is 
also wrong specifi cally from the point of view of Williamson’s epistemicism, 
because of the latter’s commitment to Semantic Plasticity, according to which 
a necessary condition for the truth of  ▿ ϕ is that ϕ fails to express the same 
proposition in all close worlds. The otherworldly semantics allow  ▿ ϕ to be true 
even when ϕ is not semantically plastic. 
 Let us next consider the actualistic semantics. 
 One problem with these is that they misclassify certain defi nite disquota-
tional sentences as non-defi nite (both in the actual world and worlds close to the 
actual world). That they misclassify certain defi nite T-sentences as non-defi nite 
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is particularly damning, given that one of epistemicism’s advertised virtues was 
its ability to respect the disquotational conception of truth. 23  
 To present the problems that disquotational sentences pose for the actualistic 
semantics properly it will be necessary to extend the 2D model theory to deal 
with a language that results from adding some predicates and singular terms to 
 L VM  . To that end, let a 2D model now be a quadruple 〈 W ,  R ,  D , ⟦.⟧〉, where  W and 
 R are as before,  D is a non-empty set representing the domain of individuals, 
and ⟦.⟧ is otherwise as before, except that, for all singular terms τ, τ 1 , …, τ n  , and 
all  n -place predicates  ϕ , 
 (vi)  ⟦τ⟧ is a function from  W  ×  W to  D 
 (vii)  ⟦ ϕ ⟧ is a function from  W  ×  W to   ( D n  ) 




w,v = 1 iff  〈⟦τ 1 ⟧( w ,  v ), …, ⟦τ n  ⟧( w ,  v )〉 ෛ ⟦ ϕ ⟧( w ,  v ) 
 In order to deal with disquotational sentences, we’ll assume that, for each 
expression ξ, there is a singular term  ⌜ ξ ⌝  (a quote name) such that, in the intended 
model, 
 (ix)  If @ Rw , then ⟦ ⌜ ξ ⌝ ⟧( w ,  v ) = ξ 
 Now let us begin by considering  T - sentences , i.e. sentences of the form 
 T ( ⌜ ϕ⌝ ) ิ  ϕ, where  T is the enriched language’s truth predicate. For paradox-avoid-
ing reasons we had better not assume that all T-sentences are true, so, since 
defi niteness is factive, we had better not assume that all T-sentences are defi -
nite either. But let us say that a T-sentence is  healthy when the sentence whose 
quote-name occurs in it is suitable in the sense of note 2. Certainly, we can safely 
assume that all healthy T-sentences are defi nite. And we can safely assume also 
all healthy T-sentences are defi nite in all close worlds, as used in those worlds. 
This is because a world is close to the actual world iff  it is semantically indiscrim-
inable from it; a world in which a healthy T-sentence, as used in that world, is 
not defi nite in that world, is one in which T-sentences are semantically diff erent, 
and are semantically diff erent in a discriminable way (since we know all healthy 
T-sentences are defi nite), from how they are in the actual world. 
 However, there is a straightforward argument for the conclusion that, if either 
of the actualistic semantics is correct, then some healthy T-sentence is not defi -
nite in some close world. The argument has two premises. The fi rst is that, in 
the intended model, 
 (1) If ϕ is suitable, then ϕ ෛ ⟦ T ⟧( @ ,  w ) iff  |ϕ| w , w  = 1. 
 (1) is, I take it, an uncontroversial minimal condition on the behavior of a 
truth predicate: it says that the truth predicate, as interpreted in the actual 
world, applies to a suitable sentence in a world  w just in case that sentence, as 
used in  w , expresses a proposition that is true in  w . This follows from the trifl ing 
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observations that, fi rst, necessarily, a suitable sentence is true iff  the proposition 
it expresses is true, and, second, that, necessarily, a suitable sentence is true iff  
it belongs to the extension determined by the actual semantic value of ‘true.’ 
 (1), together with either of the actualistic semantics, implies: 
 (1*) If @ Rw , |ϕ| @, w  ≠ |ϕ| w , w , and ϕ is suitable, then | △ ( T ( ⌜ ϕ⌝ ) ิ ϕ)| w , w  = 0. 24  
The second premise of the argument is: 
 (2) For some  w and some suitable ϕ, @ Rw and |ϕ| @, w  ≠ |ϕ| w , w . 
 (1*) and (2) imply that there is a healthy T-sentence that is not defi nite in some 
close world, which is absurd. 
 The case for (1) is overwhelming. What about (2)? Note that anyone who 
accepts either actualistic semantics must accept, on pain of denying that there 
are any suitable borderline sentences, that there are worlds  v ,  w , and a suitable 
sentence ϕ, such that  vRw , |ϕ| v , w  ≠ |ϕ| w , w ; otherwise, on either actualistic seman-
tics,  ▿ ϕ is false at every proper point of evaluation, so in particular is actually 
false. Given this, it would be very odd if there were no such cases in which  v  = @ 
— which is to say, if (2) were not true. 
 There is a similar argument to be made about disquotational  R - sentences — 
sentences like 
 (E) ‘Mount Everest’ refers to Mount Everest. 
 To deal with these, we’ll assume that the object language contains a reference 
predicate  Ref . An R-sentence, then, has the form  Ref ( ⌜ τ ⌝ , τ). Clearly (at least, given 
our idealizations), we want to say that all R-sentences are defi nite. But there is 
a straightforward argument for the conclusion that this is not so if either of the 
actualistic semantics is correct. 
 This argument, too, has two premises. The fi rst is that, in the intended model, 
 (3) 〈 x ,  y 〉 ෛ ⟦ Ref ⟧( @ ,  w ) iff  ⟦ x ⟧( w ,  w ) =  y 
 (3) is minimal condition on  Ref expressing the relation that ‘refers’ expresses 
in (E): (3) says, in eff ect, that, necessarily, a pair 〈 x ,  y 〉 belongs to the extension 
determined by the relation  Ref is as  actually used to express if and only if  x refers 
to  y . Since  Ref is actually used to express the relation of reference, (3) reduces 
to the trivial observation that, necessarily, a pair 〈 x ,  y 〉 belongs to the extension 
determined by the relation of reference if and only if  x refers to  y . 
  (3), together with either of the actualistic semantics, implies: 
 (3*) If ⟦τ⟧( w ,  w ) ≠ ⟦τ⟧(@,  w ) and  w R@ then | △ Ref ( ⌜ τ ⌝ , τ)| w , w  = 0. 25  
  The second premise of the argument is: 
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 (4)  For some singular term τ and some world  w , ⟦τ⟧( w ,  w ) ≠ ⟦τ⟧(@,  w ) and 
 wR @. 
 (4) and (3*) entail that some R-sentence is non-defi nite in some close world, 
which is absurd. 
 The argument had two premises: (3) and (4). (3) was a truism. What about 
(4)? As in the case of the argument concerning T-sentences, it can be argued 
that the advocate of an actualistic semantics must accept (4) — in this case, on 
pain of denying the that there are borderline identity statements with proper 
names, given the natural way of introducing an identity predicate = into the 
semantics, which is via the clause 
 |τ 1  = τ 2 | w , v  = 1 iff  |τ 1 | w , v  = |τ 2 | w , v . 
 Assuming, again following Kripke ( 1980 ), that proper names are modally rigid, 
which is to say, in the 2D setting, that |τ| w , v  = |τ| w , u , the only way for  ▿ (τ 1  = τ 2 ) to 
be true, on either actualistic semantics, is for there to be worlds  w ,  v , such that 
⟦τ 1 ⟧( w ,  w ) ≠ ⟦τ 2 ⟧( v ,  w ) and  wRv . It would be very odd if there were no such case 
in which  v  = @. 
 (Further counterexamples involving other kinds of disquotational sentences 
— e.g. of the form ‘ීx (‘ F ’ applies to  x  ิ   F ( x ))’ — can be devised, but I’ll leave them 
as an exercise for the reader.) 
 The problems for the actualistic semantics do not end there. I’ll mention one 
further problem that will make an interesting test case for further semantic 
proposals. Consider the  Meter Sentence made famous by Kripke ( 1980 , 54f ):
 The Standard Meter is one meter long. 
 The Standard Meter is, of course, the object whose length is used to fi x the 
reference (and content) of ‘meter.’ Since the length of the Standard Meter — a 
platinum bar cast using nineteenth-century technology — could very easily 
have been diff erent from its actual length, the Meter Sentence could very easily 
have expressed a proposition that is actually false. It is also highly plausible that 
some of the worlds in which the Meter Sentence expresses a proposition that is 
actually false, are worlds that are close to the actual world in the sense of ‘close’ 
that matters to the epistemicist interpretation of  △ ; but if so, it follows by either 
actualistic semantics that the Meter Sentence is borderline, so, because border-
line status is incompatible with knowledge, no one knows that the Standard 
Meter is one meter long, which is absurd. 
 (Counterexamples like the above can be multiplied indefi nitely. ‘Kilogram,’ 
‘second,’ and other measure words whose reference is fi xed by paradigm objects 
whose relevant measurements could very easily have been diff erent than they 
actually are easily lend themselves to similar counterexamples. So, in general 
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do cases in which we use a reference-fi xing description that could very easily 
have had a referent diff erent from its actual referent.) 
 I think the arguments given so far establish the incorrectness of both of the 
otherworldly semantics and both of the actualistic semantics, but they do not 
come close to showing that there is  no 2D semantics for  L VM  acceptable to epis-
temicists. After all, I have only considered four possible truth defi nition clauses 
for  △ within 2D model theory — the ones corresponding to the two proposals 
Caie ( 2012 ) fi nds the most ‘natural’ — but this still leaves a large number of 
alternative truth defi nition clauses unexamined. 26  Are we in a position to know 
that all of the alternatives are also unacceptable? 
 In fact, we are, at least if we impose some further natural conditions on the 
adequacy of an epistemicist semantics for  L VM  . We only need two conditions in 
addition to Defi nitization. The fi rst condition is that every instance of the schema 
 K :  △ (ϕ  ⊃ψ) ⊃ (△ ϕ  ⊃△ψ) 
 should be true in the intended model. The second is that there should be no 
vagueness in the world, in a sense that will be made precise below. A result by 
Peter Fritz, which is included in the Appendix to this paper (Fritz  2016 ), shows 
that there is a precise sense in which there is no 2D semantics for  L VM  that sat-
isfi es all three conditions. 
 The idea that there is no vagueness in the world is most naturally expressed 
using propositional quantifi cation, although we will later see that this is dis-
pensable. Let us, then, begin by considering the language  L VMQ  , which results 
from the addition of propositional variables and the universal quantifi er ී to 
 L VM  , with the usual formation rules. In  L VMQ  , we express the claim that there is no 
vagueness in the world by the sentence 
 NVW : ීp ( p  ิ  △ p ), 
 which says, in eff ect, that every state of aff airs (proposition) obtains iff  it defi -
nitely obtains. Semantic Plasticity mandates NVW: if every borderline formula 
could easily have had expressed a proposition other than the proposition it 
actually expresses, a formula that is a variable cannot be borderline because, 
under any given variable assignment, it could not have expressed any proposi-
tion other than the one it actually expresses. The same goes,  mutatis mutandis , 
for variables of all types. (For similar reasons, one would expect a supervalua-
tionist to endorse NVW.) 27  
 Now of course an epistemicist who endorses NVW must reject the validity 
of universal instantiation on propositional variables, as that rule would take us 
from the plausible NVW to each instance of the absurd schema 
 TRIV : ϕ ิ  △ ϕ, 
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 which says, in eff ect, that there is no vagueness. But there is nothing new here: 
it is natural for epistemicists (and indeed supervaluationists) to reject the valid-
ity of universal instantiation on variables of all types. For example, in a fi rst-or-
der language with  △ , it is natural for an epistemicist (or supervaluationist) to 
accept   ∀x∀y(x = y ⊃ △x = y)  while rejecting some instances of  a = b ⊃ △a = b , 
because there are vague names. 28  
 Let us next consider how we should augment the 2D model theory in order 
to handle the  L VMQ  . Intuitively, the propositional variables range over proposi-
tions. In the model theory, however, we must interpret them, under a variable 
assignment, as entities of the same type as a model’s interpretation function 
assigns to the atomic sentences, which is to say, as sets of points of evaluation 
of the model. Now clearly, the admissible values of the propositional variables 
cannot be  all sets of such pairs: some of them represent context-dependent 
as well as circumstance-dependent variation in truth value, whereas the truth 
value of a proposition depends only on the circumstance. The admissible values 
of the propositional variables, then, must satisfy the condition 
 〈 w ,  v 〉 ෛ  X  iff   〈 u ,  v 〉 ෛ  X . 
 Let’s say that any set of points of evaluation satisfying the above condition is a 
 barcode . 29  In the intended model, the subsets of  W  ×  W that are barcodes, then, 
represent the propositions. We’ll defi ne a  variable assignment on a model as any 
function from the propositional variables to the model’s barcodes. Now the 
notion of the truth value |ϕ|  픘
g
w,v of a formula ϕ at a point of evaluation 〈 w ,  v 〉 in a 
model  픘 is relativized to a variable assignment  g . |ϕ|  픘
g
w,v will be defi ned exactly 
like |ϕ|  픘w,v except for when ϕ is a propositional variable or a universally quantifi ed 
formula; for these cases we add (xii) and (xiii). 
 (xii)  |p|픘
g
w,v = 1 iff  〈 w ,  v 〉 ෛ  g ( p ) 
 (xiii)  |∀p ϕ  |픘
g
w,v =1 iff ,  for each variable assignment  f on  픘 diff ering from 
 g at most in what  f assigns to  p , |ϕ|픘fw,v = 1 
 Logical consequence is defi ned as truth preservation at each proper point of 
each model under each variable assignment on that model. 
 Now it turns out that, no matter what truth defi nition clause we introduce 
for  △ in  L VMQ  , if the clauses already introduced are in place and the model theory 
validates every instance of K and satisfi es Defi nitization, every model in which 
NVW is true at every proper point will also be a model in which every instance of 
TRIV is true at every proper point. So, in particular, this will hold of the intended 
model, and there is no hope of getting an acceptable epistemicist semantics 
for  L VMQ  out of a 2D model theory. This is a consequence of Fritz’s Proposition 1, 
which is more general. Proposition 1 states that there is no way of interpreting 
 △ by a Scott–Montague neighborhood function that satisfi es our desiderata 
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without validating every instance of TRIV. Each way of interpreting  △ in a rela-
tional model-theoretic semantics of the kind I have been working with in this 
section corresponds to a neighborhood function, but not conversely. There is, 
then, a good sense in which Fritz’s result shows that there is no 2D model the-
ory that can serve as the basis of an acceptable epistemicist semantics for  L VMQ  . 
 Fritz’s result does not rely essentially on the presence of propositional quan-
tifi cation in the language. While we cannot express the claim that there is no 
vagueness in the world in  L VM  , we can express that claim in the 2D semantics 
of  L VM  by requiring that, for each barcode  b , the neighborhood function that 
interprets  △ , in eff ect, classifi es  b as defi nite at a proper point of evaluation iff  
 b is true at that point. Let us call this condition  NVW* . If we assume that the 
interpretation of  △ obeys NVW*, and we assume Defi nitization and the validity 
of each instance of K, it once again follows that each instance of TRIV is true. 
For let us say, following Fritz, that a  generalized 2D frame is a pair 〈 W ,  D 〉, with 
 W as before and  D a neighborhood function that interprets  △ , and let us say 
that the  quantifi er - free logic of a class of generalized 2D frames is the set of all 
 L VM  -sentences true at every proper point of every model based on a frame in 
that class. Fritz’s second result (Proposition 2) states that the logic of any class 
of generalized 2D frames satisfying NVW* that includes all instances of K and 
is closed under the rule ϕ/ △ ϕ (corresponding to Defi nitization) also includes all 
instances of TRIV. Now if we make the further natural assumptions that there 
is an intended generalized 2D frame, on which the intended model is based, 
and whose logic includes each instance of K and is closed under the rule ϕ/ △ ϕ, 
it follows that if this frame satisfi es NVW*, then each instance of TRIV is true at 
each proper point of the intended model, so is true  simpliciter . 
 5. The failure of the 2D approach to the semantics of  L VM  speaks in favor of a 
move to a 3D approach. The model theory turns out to be straightforward, 
and it has already proved to be fruitful in logical investigations: Litland and 
Yli-Vakkuri ( 2016 ) show how their 3D model theory can be used to obtain com-
pleteness results for certain propositional logics of vagueness and modality, at 
least one of which is plausibly the correct logic from an epistemicist point of 
view. However, what semantics the epistemicist should marry with this model 
theory is as yet unclear. In this section I will introduce a 3D model theory for  L VM  
that is a simplifi ed version of one of the model theories discussed by Litland 
and Yli-Vakkuri, and I will ask how we might go about extracting an epistemicist 
semantics from it. 
 Let us say that a  3D model is a triple  픘  = 〈 W ,  R , ⟦.⟧〉, where  W is a non-empty 
set,  R a refl exive and symmetric relation on  W , and ⟦.⟧ a function from the atomic 
sentences to 3D points of evaluation in  픘 , which are subsets of  W  ×   W  ×   W . 
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The truth value |ϕ|  픘w,v,u  ෛ {0, 1} of a sentence ϕ at 〈 w ,  v ,  u 〉 ෛ  W  ×  W  ×  W in  픘 is 
defi ned as follows, where α is an atomic sentence and ϕ and ψ are any sentences. 
 (i)  |훼|픘w,v,u = 1 iff   ⟨w, v, u⟩ ∈ [[훼]] 
 (ii)  |¬ ϕ  |픘w,v,u = 1 iff  |ϕ  |
픘
w,v,u = 0 
 (iii)  |ϕ෺ψ |픘w,v,u = 1 iff  both |ϕ  |픘w,v,u = 1 and |ψ  |픘w,v,u = 1 
 (iv)  |✷ ϕ  |픘w,v,u = 1 iff  for all  u
′ ∈ W , |ϕ  |픘
w,v,u′
= 1 




 (vi)  |△ ϕ  |픘w,v,u = 1 iff  for all  w
′ such thatwRw′, | ϕ |픘
w′ ,v,u
= 1 
 Logical consequence is defi ned just like before, except in that one of the 
terms occurring in its defi nition is re-refi ned: we now say that a proper point of 
evaluation is a point of the form 〈 w ,  w ,  w 〉. We will also say that ϕ is true in  w iff  
ϕ is true at the proper point of  w , i.e. at 〈 w ,  w ,  w 〉. 
 As the reader can verify, this model theory does not share any of the logical 
fl aws of the otherworldly and actualistic 2D model theories discussed in Section 
4. In fact, there is some plausibility to the idea that the relation of logical con-
sequence that it — or some close variant of it 30  — delivers is the correct logic 
of vagueness and modality from an epistemicist point of view. I won’t press the 
case for that here, however. I do so in my joint work with Litland, which discusses 
both epistemicist and supervaluationist applications of the 3D model-theoretic 
framework. 31  
 It is also worth noting that the 3D model theory can easily be extended 
to handle  L VMQ  from Section 4. The extension is carried out using exactly the 
same defi nition of the notion of truth at a point in a model under a variable 
assignment. Only the defi nition of a barcode will be diff erent: in the 3D setting 
a barcode of a model is any set  X of points of evaluation of the model such that 
〈 w ,  v ,  u 〉 ෛ  X iff  〈 w ಿ,  v ಿ,  u 〉 ෛ  X . This model theory validates NVW, as desired, but it 
does not validate every instance of TRIV. 
 So far we only have a 3D model theory for  L VM  , but what we want is a way of 
extracting a semantics for  L VM  from that model theory. This requires us to make 
sense of the idea of a sentence being true at a triple of worlds. I will discuss two 
ways of doing so. 
 I will call fi rst way of extracting a semantics for  L VM  from the 3D model theory 
the  metasemantic interpreration of that model theory. According to the metase-
mantic interpretation, ϕ is true at 〈 w ,   v ,   u 〉 iff  the  character ϕ has in  w , when 
applied to the  context v yields a proposition that is true in the  circumstance u . 
 R can be, as before, glossed as a relation of ‘semantic indiscriminability,’ except 
in this case the semantic facts with respect to which the worlds it relates are 
indiscriminable are facts about the characters rather than about the (proposi-
tional) contents of sentences. 32  The metasemantic interpretation recognizes 
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two diff erent roles for contexts, which I’ll call the role of  metasemantic context 
(the role of the fi rst world in a triple) and simply  context (the role of the second 
world in a triple). The metasemantic context represents the dependence the 
characters of  L VM  sentences on global patterns of language use, and gener-
ally on whatever else facts about character supervene on. The context is just a 
context in Kaplan’s ( 1977 ) sense: once the character of a sentence is fi xed by a 
metasemantic context, that character is applied to a context to obtain a content. 
According to the metasemantic interpretation, then, since the character of a 
sentence is its actual character, the character of ϕ is the function λ w λ v |ϕ| @, w , v . 
A suitable characterization of the function λϕλ w λ v |ϕ| @, w , v  will be a semantics. 
 If the metasemantic interpretation is correct, then the kind of ‘semantic value’ 
mentioned in the statement of Semantic Plasticity must be character rather than 
(propositional) content. It is a consequence of the metasemantic interpretation 
that, if  ▿ ϕ is true in  w , then for some  v close to  w , the character of ϕ in  v is diff erent 
from the character of ϕ in  w . But it is not a consequence of the metasemantic 
interpretation that, if  ▿ ϕ is true in  w , then for some  v close to  w , the content of 
ϕ in  v is diff erent from the content of ϕ in  w . 
 Suppose that the metasemantic interpretation is correct. Then it will be 
tempting to think that there is a straightforward account of why it gets right 
all the cases that made trouble for the 2D actualistic semantics from Section 4. 
 Consider fi rst the case of  △ (ϕ ิ  A ϕ). Here, the 3D model theory alone solves 
the problem faced by the actualistic 2D model theories: because the 3D model 
theory validates each instance of ϕ ิ  A ϕ and satisfi es Defi nitization, it also vali-
dates each instance of  △ (ϕ ิ   A ϕ). A valid sentence is true at every proper point of 
the intended model, so is true  simpliciter . So, each instance of  △ (ϕ ิ  A ϕ) is true. 
 The metasemantic interpretation, however, also delivers an explanation of 
 why the model theory gets the case of  △ (ϕ ิ  A ϕ) right, as follows. 
 Let’s say that a character  f is  diagonally true iff , for all  w ,  f ( w )( w ) = 1. As we have 
learned from Kaplan, the character of any instance of ϕ ิ  A ϕ is diagonally true. 
That the character of each instance of ϕ ิ   A ϕ is diagonally true is a semantic fact 
about instances of ϕ ิ   A ϕ, in the sense of ‘semantic’ relevant to semantic discrim-
inability under the metasemantic interpretation. It is also a known semantic fact. 
But since it is, in the relevant sense, a known semantic fact that the character 
of each instance of ϕ ิ  A ϕ is diagonally true, then each instance of ϕ ิ  A ϕ has a 
diagonally true character in every metasemantic context semantically indiscrim-
inable from ( R -related to) the actual one. It immediately follows that, in every 
metasemantic context  R -related to the actual one, each instance of ϕ ิ  A ϕ has 
a character that, when applied to the actual world, gives a proposition that is 
true in the actual world, and this, by the metasemantic interpretation and (vi), 
is equivalent to saying that each instance of  △ (ϕ ิ  A ϕ) is true. 
 It is tempting to generalize this explanation to all of the problematic cases, 
and to conjecture that T-sentences, R-sentences, the Meter Sentence, etc., 
all have characters that are known to be diagonally true (both in the actual 
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metasemantic context and in ones  R -related to it), so the defi nitizations of those 
sentences are true (both in the actual metasemantic context and in ones close 
to it). Here is why that line of thought is tempting. 
 Consider, to begin, either kind of disquotational sentence. Even though the 
propositions expressed by, e.g. ‘“Tim is thin” is true iff  Tim is thin’ and ‘“Tim” refers 
to Tim’ are contingent, each sentence appears to be associated with a kind of 
semantic guarantee of truth. One natural way to make precise the idea of a 
sentence enjoying a semantic guarantee of truth is to say that the sentence 
has a diagonally true character: a diagonally true character guarantees that, 
in any world, the sentence expresses a proposition that — even though it may 
be a contingent proposition — is true in that world. Similarly, even though the 
Meter Sentence expresses a contingent proposition, and one that could very 
easily have been false, there is something about the convention we use to fi x the 
content of ‘meter’ that guarantees that the sentence cannot be asserted falsely 
(as long as that convention is in eff ect, and as long as the other words in the 
sentence have their actual conventional meanings). If we take the further step 
of assuming that the convention in question is the character of ‘meter,’ then it 
will be tempting to conclude that the character of the Meter Sentence is also 
diagonally true. And similarly for other similar sentences involving ‘kilogram,’ 
‘second,’ etc. If the characters of all of the problematic sentences are diagonally 
true in all worlds close to the actual one, and we are in a position to know this 
in all worlds close to the actual one, then they will all be defi nite, according to 
the metasemantic interpretation of the 3D model theory, in all worlds close to 
the actual one. 
 Superfi cially, at least, this line of thought seems attractive. Yet it is, I think, 
quite clearly incorrect. The metasemantic interpretation faces two serious 
problems, the second of which I fi nd to be an especially decisive consideration 
against adopting it. 
 The fi rst problem is this. Under the metasemantic interpretation, the 3D 
model theory only diff ers from the otherworldly 2D semantics on whether  △ ϕ 
is true at the proper point of  w (i.e. at 〈 w ,  w 〉 according to the 2D model theory 
and at 〈 w ,  w ,  w 〉 according to the 3D model theory) when ϕ has a non-constant 
character (i.e. is an indexical sentence) in some world close to  w . It follows that 
disquotational sentences, the Meter Sentence, etc., must be indexical, in the 
actual world or worlds close to it, in subtle ways we haven’t noticed before. 
Since a sentence is indexical in a world if and only if at least one of its simple 
constituents is, 33  these sentences must contain indexical words: apparently ‘true,’ 
‘refers,’  ‘meter,’ and so on. Yet it is very unclear what the non-constant characters 
of the semantic predicates might be. In the case of ‘meter,’ one might think, as 
suggested above, that the non-constant character is the function that assigns 
to each world  w the property of being as long as the Standard Meter is in  w (or 
the content that represents that property). But one might also think, more plau-
sibly, that this line of thought confuses semantic with metasemantic matters: 
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the convention that fi xes the content of ‘meter’ also fi xes its character, which is 
constant. Thus, if the length of the Standard Meter had been diff erent from its 
actual length, the Meter Sentence would have had both a diff erent character 
and a diff erent content. And indeed this is the consensus on how so-called 
‘reference-fi xing descriptions’ work: they do not introduce indexicals, but rather 
expressions whose character as well as content depends on what satisfi es the 
description. 34  If the consensus is correct, as I take it to be, then the metasemantic 
interpretation is incorrect. 
 (What about the above sketch of an argument for the conclusion that disquo-
tational sentences and the Meter Sentence have diagonally true characters in 
all worlds close to the actual world? It confuses two properties: that of having a 
diagonally true character and that of having a character that determines a true 
proposition. It is plausible that each of the problematic sentences has, in each 
world  R -related to the actual one, a character that, when applied to  w , yields 
a proposition that is true in  w . But it does not follow from this — and nothing 
has been said to support the claim — that each of the problematic sentences 
has, in each world  R -related to the actual one, a character that, when applied 
to an arbitrary world  v , yields a proposition that is true in  v — i.e. a diagonally 
true character.) 
 The second problem with the metasemantic interpretation was noticed by 
John Hawthorne. In conversation, Hawthorne observed that we can refer to the 
actual world by both indexical and non-indexical means, and he used this to 
make trouble for the metasemantic interpretation. Here, I will present a simpli-
fi ed version of Hawthorne’s objection: 35  
 The indexical means of referring to referring to the actual world in  L VM  is, of 
course, to use  A . But we could also introduce a non-indexical ‘actuality’ operator 
into a language as follows. First, we introduce a non-indexical proper name, say, 
‘Worldy,’ for the actual world into our metalanguage; then we enrich  L VM  with 
an operator  A *, such that  A *ϕ translates into the metalanguage as ‘In Worldy, 
it is the case that ϕ.’ Since we know that  A * has a constant character, 36   A * must, 
by familiar reasoning, have a constant character in every world  R -related to the 
actual one. In particular, it must be that: 
 (1)   If @ Rw , then | A *ϕ| w , v , u  = 1 iff  |ϕ| w , w , w  = 1. 
 It follows that each instance of  A *ϕ ิ   A ϕ is true, and, having noticed this, we know 
that each instance of  A *ϕ ิ   A ϕ is true. But from (1) and the rest of our semantics 
it follows that an instance of  △ ( A *ϕ ิ   A ϕ) is false whenever |ϕ| w , w , w  ≠  |ϕ| w , @ , @ , 
for some  w such that @ Rw . That there is a world  w and a sentence ϕ such that 
|ϕ| w , w , w  ≠ |ϕ| w , @ , @  is pretty clear. (According to the semantics, there is vagueness 
only if there are  R -related worlds  w ,  v such that |ϕ| w , w , w  ≠  |ϕ| w , v , v , and it would 
be odd if there were no such case in which  v  = @.) But then such an instance 
of  A *ϕ ิ  A ϕ will be a counterexample to the principle that knowledge entails 
defi niteness. 
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 This latter problem, which I take to be decisive, exposes a weakness that the 
metasemantic interpretation of the 3D model theory shares with both of the 
actualistic 2D semantics. According to all of these semantics it is suffi  cient for the 
truth of  ▿ ϕ at a proper point that ϕ is false at an  improper point suitably related 
to it. But no one ever uses, or could use, a sentence at an improper point, so,  a 
fortiori , no one ever uses, or could use, a sentence to say something false at an 
improper point. Falsehood at such a point is not a genuine possibility of error, 
so is not the kind of possibility of error whose closeness precludes knowledge. 
 The second way of extracting a semantics from the 3D model theory, which 
I fi nd to be more promising, is the  epistemic interpretation . According to the 
epistemic interpretation, the fi rst coordinate of a 3D point of evaluation is not 
a metaphysically possible world, but an epistemic possibility, in a certain broad 
sense, about which I will have more to say below. I will use ‘ e, ’  ‘ e ಿ,’ etc., as variables 
for these (broadly speaking) epistemic possibilities, and I will call the epistemic 
possibility that obtains in  w ‘ e ( w )’; the actual epistemic possibility, then, is des-
ignated by ‘ e (@).’ The rough idea is that ϕ is true at 〈 e ,  w ,  v 〉 iff  the proposition 
ϕ expresses in  w , according to  e , is true in  v . A proper point of evaluation will 
be of the form 〈 e ( w ),  w ,  w 〉. (Thus ‘epistemic interpretation’ turns out to be a bit 
of a misnomer: it is not an merely an interpretation of the 3D formal appara-
tus, since it requires our semantics for  L VM  to draw fi ner distinctions than that 
apparatus does, such as the distinction between  e ( w ) and  w . I will return to 
the importance of keeping epistemic possibilities and metaphysically possible 
worlds separate below.) 
 The epistemic interpretation makes no use of the Kaplanian distinction 
between character and content. When an epistemic possibility  e represents a 
sentence ϕ as expressing diff erent propositions in worlds  w and  v , this could 
come about in two ways: either ϕ has diff erent constant characters in  w and in 
 v according to  e or ϕ has the same character in  w and in  v according to  e , but 
this character is variable and determines diff erent contents in  w and in  v . The 
epistemic interpretation is entirely insensitive to whether a given diff erence in 
content is due to a diff erence in character. For this reason it is not vulnerable to 
the fi rst problem faced by the metasemantic interpretation: under the epistemic 
interpretation, that the 3D semantics and the 2D actualistic semantics diff er on 
whether a sentence is defi nite at a proper point of evaluation tells us nothing 
about whether the sentence is indexical at any point. 
 According to the epistemic interpretation, the function λϕλ w λ v |ϕ| e , w , v  takes 
each sentence to the function that takes each world to the content that sen-
tence expresses in that world, according to the epistemic possibility  e . Which 
proposition a sentence expresses in a world is not a contingent matter; there-
fore (by (vi) and the fact that there is vagueness) some of the epistemic pos-
sibilities are metaphysically impossible.  e will be metaphysically possible only 
if λϕλ w λ v |ϕ| e , w , v  = λϕλ w λ v |ϕ| e (@), w , v . The only feature of  e relevant to the envi-
sioned semantics is the way in which content facts supervene some of the facts 
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according to  e , which is represented by the function λϕλ w λ v |ϕ| e , w , v . The bare-
bones version of the epistemic interpretation off ered here is neutral on the 
question of just which facts constitute the supervenience base in question. 
One answer, which is in the spirit of Hawthorne ( 2006 ), is that they are all of the 
‘metaphysical groundfl oor’ facts in some sense — perhaps the microphysical 
facts. Another possible answer is that they are all of the facts about the use of 
language, where ‘use’ is construed broadly enough to guarantee that no two 
worlds diff er with respect to content facts without diff ering with respect to the 
use facts. However the details are fi lled in, the epistemic interpretation is com-
mitted to ignorance due to vagueness being explained by a kind of principled 
ignorance of the way in which semantic (content) facts supervene on certain 
other facts. In this respect, it represents a departure from the epistemicism of 
Williamson ( 1994 ): it does not include a commitment to Semantic Plasticity 
(although it is consistent with it) — a matter to which I’ll return below. 
 For this reason, on the epistemic interpretation,  R can no longer be glossed 
as ‘semantic indiscriminability.’ Rather, points of the fi rst dimension that are 
 R -related to the actual point  e (@) represent ways in which, for all we (or creatures 
relevantly like us) are actually in a position to know, the content facts supervene 
on certain other facts. The points  R -related to points  R -related to  e (@) represent 
ways in which, for all we are actually in a position to know, for all we are in a 
position to know, the content facts supervene on certain other facts, etc. For 
this reason I called the points of the fi rst dimension epistemic possibilities ‘in a 
broad sense.’ Assuming that all of the points are related to  e (@) by the ancestral 
of  R , strictly speaking the only epistemic possibilities are those  R -related to  e (@), 
while the others are either merely epistemically possibly epistemically possible, 
or merely epistemically possibly epistemically possibly epistemically possible, 
etc. Nevertheless, for lack of a better term, I will continue to call these points 
‘epistemic possibilities.’ 
 Now, it is fairly clear that the epistemic interpretation does not have a prob-
lem accounting for the defi niteness of disquotational sentences, the Meter 
Sentence, or other similar cases involving reference-fi xing convention. For 
consider the version of the epistemic interpretation according to which the 
points on the fi rst dimension represent epistemic possibilities for the content 
facts to supervene on the use facts. It is highly plausible that, while I am largely 
in the dark about the details of the supervenience function for, say, the Meter 
Sentence, I am in a position to know enough about that function to rule out its 
being one that assigns to the actual use facts a proposition that is false in the 
actual world. 37  And the same goes for disquotational sentences and for the other 
problematic cases involving reference-fi xing conventions, as well as, indeed, for 
the Hawthorne-inspired example,  A *ϕ ิ  A ϕ. 
 Now one might worry that the epistemic interpretation nevertheless fails to 
address Hawthorne’s problem: after all, what’s to stop someone from adding to 
 L VM  an operator  A 
†  for which it is simply stipulated that 
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 (1ಿ) If  e (@) Re , then | A †  ϕ| e , v , u  = 1 iff  |ϕ| e , e , e  = 1? 
 Then, by familiar reasoning, some instances of  A †  ϕ ิ  A ϕ will be borderline but 
known to be true. The answer to this worry is simply that, according to the kind 
of semantics under consideration, |ϕ| e , e , e  is undefi ned, because |ϕ| e , w , v  is defi ned 
only when  w and  v are metaphysical, not epistemic, possibilities. (This is where 
the 3D model theory will require some tweaking if it is to deliver the intended 
model.) 
 One might be inspired by Hawthorne’s example to have the following further 
worry. If we introduce an operator  A ‡  for which the condition 
 (1ೀ) | A ‡  ϕ| e , v , u  = 1 iff  |ϕ| e ( @ ), v , u  = 1 
 holds, and we know that (1ೀ) holds then, whenever ϕ is borderline, ϕ ิ  A ‡  ϕ will 
also be borderline, yet known to be true. 
 I am not entirely clear on what the correct answer to this worry is, but, 
whatever it is, it is not particularly incumbent upon the advocate of the epis-
temic interpretation to come up with it. An ‘epistemic actuality’ operator like 
 A ‡  would wreak havoc on the semantic applications of any standard model 
theory for epistemic logic. 38  For suppose that there is a knowledge operator  K 
such that, as is standard, we treat  K ϕ as true in an epistemic possibility  e iff  ϕ is 
true in every epistemic possibility relevantly accessible (by a refl exive relation) 
from  e . Then, if there is a unique actual epistemic possibility  e (@) such that ϕ 
is true in  e (@) iff  ϕ is true, and there is an operator  E @  such that  E @  ϕ is true in 
an arbitrary epistemic possibility  e iff  ϕ is true in  e (@), then every instance of 
K (ϕ  ≡ E@ ϕ)  ⊃ (Kϕ  ∨ K¬ ϕ) is true. But this is absurd: if  E @  is interpretable in this 
manner at all, then it will often be much more diffi  cult to know whether ϕ is 
true than to know that ϕ ิ  E @  ϕ is true. We can come to know the latter simply 
by coming to know the semantic stipulation by which  E @  was introduced plus 
disquotation, but we cannot come to know all truths in this way. Since, according 
to the epistemic interpretation, the fi rst coordinate of a point of evaluation is 
an epistemic rather than a metaphysical possibility, the envisaged introduction 
of  A ‡  by (1ೀ) amounts to the introduction of an ‘epistemic actuality’ operator, 
which is presumably impossible for whatever reason the introduction of  E @  , 
as described in this paragraph, is impossible. And if it is not impossible, then 
this points to a crisis in the foundations of the standard approach to the model 
theory of languages with epistemic operators, rather than a problem for the 
epistemic interpretation of the 3D model theory for  L VM  in particular. 
 Finally, I will mention, without attempting to answer, two open questions 
about the epistemic interpretation. The fi rst concerns Semantic Plasticity. The 
epistemic interpretation notably diff ers from the metasemantic interpretation 
in that the former does not entail Semantic Plasticity, for any natural interpre-
tation of ‘semantic value.’ It does entail, of course, that when ϕ is borderline, ϕ 
expresses in the actual world, according to some close epistemic possibility, a 
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proposition other than the one it actually expresses in the actual world. But, 
as we have already seen, any such epistemic possibility will be metaphysically 
impossible, because it is a non-contingent matter which proposition is actually 
expressed by a sentence. Semantic Plasticity requires that a borderline sentence 
 could have — in an alethic rather than epistemic modal sense — easily had a 
semantic value other than its actual semantic value. The epistemic interpretation 
is consistent with Semantic Plasticity: we could consistently add to it the claim 
that whenever a sentence ϕ expresses in the actual world, according to a close 
epistemic possibility, some proposition  p other than the one it actually expresses 
in the actual world, there is also a metaphysical possibility that could easily have 
obtained (in which the use facts are ever so slightly diff erent from the actual use 
facts) in which ϕ does express  p . But so far it is unclear why the existence of such 
a metaphysical possibility would be required for an explanation of ignorance of 
borderline matters, since the epistemic interpretation already makes available 
an alternative explanation in terms of some kind of principled ignorance of the 
supervenience of content facts on certain other facts. 
 At least one issue in this area seems reasonably clear, which is that an expla-
nation of ignorance of borderline matters in terms of Semantic Plasticity can-
not require all of the close possibilities of error that preclude knowledge of 
borderline matters to be metaphysical possibilities. That is, it cannot be that, 
whenever ϕ is borderline, there is a close metaphysically possible world  w such 
that: in  w ϕ expresses some proposition  p other than the proposition ϕ actually 
expresses, and the truth value  p has in  w is diff erent from the actual truth value 
of the proposition ϕ actually expresses. 39  To see why this cannot be so, note fi rst 
that the proposed principle entails (*). 
 (*)  Whenever ϕ is true and borderline, there is a close metaphysically possi-
ble world in which ϕ expresses a proposition other than the proposition 
ϕ actually expresses, and in which that proposition is false. 
 We can use Semantic Plasticity to argue against (*) as follows. Consider the case 
of a non-semantically plastic, so, by Semantic Plasticity, non-borderline sentence 
ᅊ that specifi es the all of the actual use facts. Let χ be any true borderline sen-
tence, and let  p @  be the proposition actually expressed by χ. Then, given the 
supervenience of content facts on use facts, 
 (**)  It is necessary that, if the proposition actually expressed by ᅊ is true, 
then χ expresses  p @ . 
 Since χ is borderline but ᅊ is not, it follows, on very minimal assumptions about 
the logic of defi niteness, 40  that ᅊ  ⊃  χ is borderline. ᅊ  ⊃  χ is also true, because χ is 
true. By (*), then, there is a close metaphysically possible world in which ᅊ  ⊃  χ 
expresses a proposition other than the proposition ᅊ ๖ χ actually expresses, and 
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in which that proposition is false. To see that there is no such world, suppose 
for a contradiction that there is one — call it ‘ w *’ — and consider two cases: 
 First case: the proposition ᅊ actually expresses is true in  w *. It follows by (**) that χ 
expresses  p @  — i.e. the proposition χ actually expresses — in  w *. Since ᅊ is not seman-
tically plastic, ᅊ expresses what it actually expresses in  w * as well. Consequently, ᅊ  ⊃  χ 
expresses what it actually expresses in  w *, contrary to hypothesis. 
 Second case: the proposition ᅊ actually expresses is not true in  w *. Again, 
since ᅊ is not semantically plastic, ᅊ expresses what it actually expresses in  w *. 
It follows that the proposition ᅊ expresses in  w * is not true in  w *, and so it also 
follows that the proposition ᅊ expresses in  w * is false in  w *, and that the propo-
sition ᅊ  ⊃  χ expresses in  w * is true in  w *, contrary to hypothesis. 41  , 42  
 The second open question concerns the principled ignorance of the super-
venience of content on use that the advocate of the epistemic interpretation 
must posit. 43  I have no explanation of it to off er, but I will note, following 
Williamson, that any epistemicist must posit unknowable necessary truths: 44  
e.g. if a net worth of $5,000,000 is the cut-off  for wealth, then it is a necessary 
but borderline, and therefore unknowable, truth that to be wealthy is to have a 
net worth of at least $5,000,000. Of course, Williamson off ers an explanation of 
the unknowability of such truths in terms of Semantic Plasticity, but the above 
argument casts doubt on the idea that such an explanation will be available in 
every case of ignorance of borderline matters. 
 6. I have argued that an acceptable epistemicist semantics for a language con-
taining a defi niteness operator  △ along with operators for metaphysical neces-
sity (✷) and metaphysical actuality ( A ) cannot be developed using the resources 
of the kind of 2D model theory that is standardly used in logical and semantic 
investigations of the interaction of ✷ and  A alone. This suggests a move to the 
3D model-theoretic framework that I developed with Jon Litland. The latter has 
already proved to be fruitful for logical investigations, but it remains an open 
question how, if at all, it can serve as the basis for a satisfactory epistemicist 
semantics for the interaction of  △ , ✷, and  A . I have sketched two ways in which 
one might attempt to extract an epistemicist semantics from the 3D model the-
ory. The fi rst of these was the metasemantic interpretation of the model theory, 
which vindicated a form of Semantic Plasticity, but with Kaplanian characters 
rather than contents (propositions) in the role of semantic value. The second of 
these was the epistemic interpretation, according to which the fi rst dimension 
of semantic evaluation represents, in a certain broad sense, all of the epistem-
ically possible ways for the content facts to supervene on certain other facts. 
While enjoying some superfi cial plausibility, the metasemantic interpretation 
turned out to have implausible consequences concerning indexicals. My own 
money is on the epistemic interpretation, or something close to it, delivering 
the correct epistemicist semantics, but if it or something like it does so, it is an 
interesting open question what role is left for Semantic Plasticity to play in the 
explanation of our ignorance of borderline matters. 
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 Notes 
 1.  Hawthorne ( 2006 ). 
 2.  That is to say, a notion of truth that satisfi es each instance of the schema ‘“ S ” is 
true iff   S, ’ where instances are obtained by replacing ‘ S ’ with a suitable sentence. A 
sentence is suitable just in case inserting it into the schema does not result in any 
trouble, such as, but not limited to, inconsistency (e.g. sentences that purport to 
ascribe truth to themselves are also not suitable). The relevant notion of suitability 
is notoriously diffi  cult to make precise. 
 3.  Williamson ( 2003 , 710). 
 4.  An equivalent defi nition of defi niteness in terms of borderline cases is perhaps 
more intuitive (it is defi nite that  S iff   S and it is not borderline whether  S ), but in 
this paper I take defi niteness as primitive, as this is more natural for logical and 
semantic investigations, in which ‘defi nitely’ is standardly treated like ‘necessarily.’ 
 5.  For example, Shapiro ( 2007 ) has this to say about epistemicism: ‘Here I do not 
muster a sustained argument against that view, and it is not polite to stare’ (7). 
This remark is directed at both Williamson ( 1994 ) and Sorensen’s ( 1988 ) earlier 
development of an epistemic theory of vagueness. 
 6.  See Hawthorne ( 2006 ), Kearns and Magidor ( 2008 ), Caie ( 2012 ), and Magidor 
( forthcoming ). 
 7.  See Williamson ( 1994 , Section 8) and ( 2003 , 710). 
 8.  The content of  A , as of any indexical, will vary with context. In this paper, the 
logical constants are given a syncategorematic treatment — the usual practice 
— but they could also be assigned characters in obvious ways. 
 9.  A diff erent approach is suggested by a passage in Kaplan’s ‘Demonstratives’: in 
general we should take the proposition expressed by ϕ in  w to be the proposition 
that  would be expressed by ϕ  if it were used in  w . (According to Remark 1 of 
Section XIX of  Demonstratives , the ‘Content of a sentence in a context is, roughly, 
the proposition the sentence would express if it were uttered in that context’ 
[Kaplan  1977 , 546].) One problem with this suggestion is that, on just about 
anyone’s conception of worlds, it is a non-contingent matter which sentences 
are used in which worlds (and more generally, what is so in a given world), 
wherefore a sentence that is not used in a world could not have been used in 
that world. (Kaplan’s contexts, I should note, are not simply worlds: they also 
include agents, times, and locations. Nevertheless, the same worry applies: given 
that it is impossible for an utterance to occur in  w unless it does occur in  w , it is 
also impossible for an utterance that doesn’t occur in  w to occur in 〈 w ,  a ,  t ,  l 〉 if 
this means, as it is naturally interpreted, that the utterance occurs in  w , and is, in 
 w , produced by agent  a at time  t and location  l .) 
 10.  One rarely encounters a compositional treatment of variable-binding: see Yli-
Vakkuri ( 2013 ). 
 11.  As in, e.g. Kaplan ( 1977 ). 
 12.  The assumption that there is an intended model is something of an idealization, 
 inter alia , for the simple reason that there may be too many entities being 
theorized about (e.g. points of evaluation) to form a set — a well-known general 
limitation of set-theoretic semantics, which I will set to one side. 
 13.  See Williamson ( 1994 , Section 5) and ( 1999 ). 
 14.  Caie ( 2012 , 365). 
 15.  Ibid . 
 16.  See note 23. 
 17.  See Davies and Humberstone ( 1980 ). 
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 18.  Kaplan’s contexts, however, are not simply worlds: see note 9. 
 19.  The example is inspired by Williamson ( 1994 , 253–254). I use it because it is 
diffi  cult to come up with other kinds of uncontroversial examples of borderline 
identity statements involving proper names. Many of the standard examples are 
arguably defi nite cases where the source of the intuition of vagueness is in the 
vagueness of, say, ‘is located at’ or ‘is part of.’ 
 20.  Thanks to Peter Fritz and Jeremy Goodman for discussion here. 
 21.  Cresswell ( 1990 ) takes just this approach. There are no expressions in his 
quantifi ed modal–temporal language whose interpretation is fi xed in all of 
his models: consequently, ‘there will be no wff  true in all interpretations, and 
thus no intensional logic.’ Yet he says of this language that ‘among its possible 
interpretations is one which comes closest to refl ecting the meanings of particular 
words in a particular natural language, for convenience English’ (7). 
 22.  Caie’s ( 2012 ) main counterexample to otherworldly semantics exploits this fl aw, 
and some of the arguments in Kearns and Magidor ( 2008 ) could be reconstructed 
as doing so, although the latter are not directly concerned with epistemicist 
interpretations of  △ . 
 23.  Caie and Hawthorne both argue that Williamson’s epistemicism has problems 
accounting for the defi niteness of certain disquotational sentences. Both 
arguments, however, rely on premises that seem to me less secure than the 
ones I use. 
 Caie ( 2012 , Section 5) does not discuss T-sentences but what I call (below) 
 R - sentences : sentences of the form ‘“ N ” refers to  N. ’ The questionable assumption 
in Caie’s argument is that (schematically), for some name ‘ N ’ there is a close world 
in which ‘ N ’’s referent is diff erent from its actual referent but in which ‘refers’ 
expresses the same content as it actually does. (An analogous assumption 
about sentences and the truth predicate could be used to argue for the non-
defi niteness of some healthy T-sentences.) But Hawthorne’s ( 2006 ) ‘domestic 
stability’ solution seems to involve rejecting this assumption. 
 Hawthorne’s ( 2006 , Section 13) argument concerns T-sentences and involves 
what seems to me a questionable move from the plausible claim (given Semantic 
Plasticity) that the truth predicate expresses a content diff erent from its actual 
content in some close worlds to the further claim that there is a close world 
where the content the truth predicate has in that world determines an extension 
diff erent from the extension determined in that world by the actual content of 
the truth predicate (197). There may be a good argument for why an epistemicist 
committed to Semantic Plasticity would have to accept the latter claim, but 
Hawthorne does not off er one. 
 24.  Suppose that (a) |ϕ| @, w   ≠  |ϕ| w,w  , (b) @ Rw , and that (c) ϕ is suitable. Note that 
|ϕ| w,w   = 1  iff   ϕ ෛ ⟦ T ⟧( @ ,  w )           by (1) and (c) 
              iff   ⟦ ⌜ ϕ⌝ ⟧( @ ,  w ) ෛ ⟦ T ⟧( @ ,  w )    by (ix) 
              iff   | T ( ⌜ ϕ⌝ )| @ , w  = 1    by (viii), 
 so |ϕ| w,w   = | T ( ⌜ ϕ⌝ )| @ , w . Then, by (a), |ϕ| @, w  ≠ | T ( ⌜ ϕ⌝ )| @ , w , so | T ( ⌜ ϕ⌝ ) ิ ϕ| @ , w  = 0. By (b) 
and either (A 1 ) or (A 2 ), | △ ( T ( 
⌜ ϕ⌝ ) ิ ϕ)| w , w  = 0. Note that this argument requires the 
assumption that  R is symmetric. There is, I think, an equally plausible argument for 
the existence of healthy T-sentences that fail to be defi nite in some close worlds 
that does not require the assumption that  R is symmetric: we can simply assume 
that, in the case at hand, both  wR @ and @ Rw . I take it to be fairly clear that there 
will be such cases if one or another of the actualistic semantics is correct, but I 
won’t supply the philosophical argument for this for lack of space. 
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 25.  | Ref (⌜τ⌝, τ)| @, w  = 1 iff   〈⟦⌜τ⌝⟧(@,  w ), ⟦τ⟧(@,  w )〉 ෛ ⟦ Ref ⟧(@,  w ) by (viii) 
   iff   〈τ, ⟦τ⟧(@,  w )〉 ෛ ⟦ Ref ⟧(@,  w )   by (ix) 
   iff   ⟦τ⟧( w ,  w ) = ⟦τ⟧(@,  w )    by (3) 
 so 
 | Ref (⌜τ⌝, τ)| @, w  = 0 iff   ⟦τ⟧( w ,  w ) ≠ ⟦τ⟧(@,  w ), 
 so, in particular, 
 (3*) If ⟦τ⟧( w ,  w ) ≠ ⟦τ⟧(@,  w ) and  wR @ then | △ Ref (⌜τ⌝, τ)| w , w  = 0. 
 26.  It is not entirely clear to me that Caie’s two options are the most natural ones. In 
fact, his taxonomy of truth conditions for  △ ϕ at proper points omits the one that 
seems to me to most closely follow the letter of Williamson’s account of ignorance 
of borderline matters. Consider, for example: 
 What distinguishes vagueness as a source of inexactness is that the mar-
gin for error principles to which it gives rise advert to small diff erences in 
meaning,  not to small diff erences in the objects under discussion (Williamson 
 1994 , 231). 
 Suppose I am on the ‘thin’ side of the boundary but only just. […] The 
sentence ‘TW is thin’ is true, but could easily have been false  without any 
change in my physical measurements or those of the relevant comparison class 
(Williamson  1994 , 231). 
 The most straightforward way of extrapolating a truth condition for  △ ϕ at a 
proper point from remarks like these would seem to be this:  △ ϕ is true at 〈 w ,  w 〉 
iff , for all  v such that  wRv and the truth value of the proposition ϕ expresses in 
 w is the same in  w and in  v , ϕ is true at 〈 v ,  v 〉. This is consistent with two truth 
defi nition clauses: 
 ( O′
1
 )  |△ ϕ  |픘w,v = 1 iff , for all  u such that  vRu and |ϕ  |
픘
v,u = |ϕ|  
픘
v,v
 , |ϕ|  픘
u,u = 1 . 
 ( O′
2
 )  |△ ϕ  |픘w,v = 1 iff , for all  u such that  wRu and |ϕ|  
픘
w,u = |ϕ|  
픘
w,w
 , |ϕ|  픘
u,u = 1 . 
 ( O′
1
 ) and ( O′
2
 ) share the logical shortcomings, respectively, of (O 1 ) and (O 2 ), and 
these are accompanied by similar semantic shortcomings. Unlike (O 1 ) and (O 2 ), 
however, ( O′
1
 ) and ( O′
2
 ) both entail that a borderline sentence expresses, in some 
close world, a proposition diff erent from the one it actually expresses. This is 
another reason why ( O′
1
 ) and ( O′
2
 ) seem to me to be closer matches, within the 
2D framework, to the letter of Williamson ( 1994 ) than (O 1 ) or (O 2 ). 
 27.  See Williamson ( 2003 ) for discussion. 
 28.  See Williamson ( 1994 , Section 9.3). 
 29.  Thanks to Peter Fritz for this evocative label. 
 30.  I am inclined to think that we should not require  R to be symmetric, but the 
assumption that  R is symmetric helps simplify some arguments in this paper. 
 31.  In addition to note 30, there are some delicate issues in this area, such as the 
status of the principles  △✷ ϕ  ⊃ ✷△ ϕ and ✷ △  ϕ  ⊃ △✷ ϕ, both of which the model 
theory validates, which I discuss in my work with Litland. A model theory in which 
 △ is interpreted by a relation on  W  ×  W  ×  W rather than on  W off ers a more fl exible 
framework for logical and semantic theorizing about  L MV  . For maximal generality 
we can also add to the models a second accessibility relation to interpret ✷. My 
work with Litland explores model theories with both features. 
 32.  For this idea to have any hope of working, we must not be too permissive about 
what to count as a fact ‘about character.’ For example, it is, in some intuitive sense, 
a fact about the character of ‘Tim is thin’ that the character of ‘Tim is thin’ is its 
actual character. Furthermore, it is a known fact. But then it cannot be a fact about 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY  833
character in the intended sense, because if it were, then no world in which ‘Tim 
is thin’ has a character diff erent from its actual character will be  R -related to the 
actual world; in any such world the known fact that the character of ‘Tim is thin’ 
is its actual character fails to obtain. 
 33.  This principle is plausible on it own, but it also becomes a theorem under the 
metasemantic interpretation of the 3D model theory, if we augment the model 
theory by assigning metasemantic characters to the logical constants in any of the 
obvious ways. Then all of the constants except for  A will have constant characters 
in every metasemantic context of every model. (We would also have to add 
functors and an identity predicate to the language to handle the Meter Sentence.) 
 34.  See Remark 11 of Section XIX of  Demonstratives (Kaplan  1977 , 551) for a classic 
articulation of the consensus view. 
 35.  In Hawthorne’s original example, we introduce an indexical singular term, 
‘Actuality,’ and a non-indexical singular term, ‘Worldy,’ to designate the actual 
world. The identity ‘Worldy  =  Actuality’ is then known but, given natural 
assumptions about how the 3D model theory would have to deal with singular 
terms and identity, is not defi nite according to the metasemantic interpretation. 
 36.  See note 8. 
 37.  It is much less clear that I am in a position to know this much about the 
supervenience of content facts on ‘metaphysical groundfl oor’ facts, for any 
natural interpretation of that phrase. For example, it is diffi  cult to see how I could 
be in a position to know anything at all about how the content facts supervene 
on the microphysical facts, unless the relevant notion of ‘being in a position to 
know’ packs in the idealization I have access to Chalmers’ ‘cosmoscope’ or a similar 
device (see Chalmers  2012 , 114–115). 
 38.  Of course, models for epistemic logic do not usually come with a designated actual 
epistemic possibility, nor with contexts that determine epistemic possibilities 
(because they usually do not come with contexts at all), but this is just an artifact 
of the model theory. A semantics must recognize, for each parameter shifted by 
an operator, a function that assigns to each context the value of that parameter 
that is ‘realized’ or ‘present’ (etc.) in that context. 
 39.  It would be natural to strengthen this condition by adding the conjunct: ‘and  w 
matches actuality with respect to the truth value of the proposition ϕ actually 
expresses,’ because possibilities in which one is in error because the facts that 
actually ϕ concerns (e.g. whether Tim is thin) are diff erent than they actually are 
irrelevant to vagueness-induced ignorance (see Williamson  1994 , 231). However, 
even the weaker condition does not hold. 
 40.  Specifi cally, we must assume that the logic of  △ validates each instance of the 
K axiom schema  △ (ϕ  ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (△ ϕ  ⊃ △ψ) , and that  △ ϕ is valid whenever ϕ is a 
truth-functional tautology — call this latter principle  Tautological Defi nitization . 
Because  △ ᅊ is true and  △ χ is not, by K, ¬ △ (ᅊ  ⊃  χ) is true. Furthermore, because χ 
is borderline, ¬ △ ¬χ is true, and we can show that ¬ △ ¬(ᅊ  ⊃  χ) is true as follows. 
First we assume for a  reductio : 
 (i)  △ ¬(ᅊ  ⊃  χ). 
 (ii) is valid by K. 
 (ii)  △ (¬(ᅊ  ⊃  χ)  ⊃  ¬χ)  ⊃  ( △ ¬(ᅊ  ⊃  χ)  ⊃   △ ¬χ),. 
 and (iii) is valid by Tautological Defi nitization. 
 (iii)  △ (¬(ᅊ  ⊃  χ)  ⊃  ¬χ). 
 Because χ is borderline, 
 (iv) ¬ △ ¬χ. 
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 (i), (ii), and (iii) imply  △ ¬χ, which contradicts (iv). We get: 
  ¬ △ ¬(ᅊ  ⊃  χ) ෺ ¬ △ (ᅊ  ⊃  χ), 
 which is defi nitionally equivalent to  ▿ (ᅊ  ⊃  χ). 
 41.  This argument does not essentially depend on the assumption that ᅊ expresses 
all of the  use facts; any kind of fact (e.g. microphysical) on which content facts 
supervene will do. Nor does the argument require the assumption that ᅊ specifi es 
 all of the facts of the relevant kind; it is enough that ᅊ specifi es enough of them 
for it to be the case that, necessarily, if the proposition actually expressed by ᅊ is 
true, then χ expresses  p @  . Thanks to John Hawthorne for discussion here. 
 42.  While I fi nd this argument to be pretty decisive, I should note that at least one 
philosopher sympathetic to epistemicism rejects two of its assumptions. Magidor 
( forthcoming ) rejects one of the ‘very minimal assumptions about the logic of 
defi niteness’ mentioned in the main text, namely the K axiom for  △ (see note 40), 
and Kearns and Magidor ( 2012 ) reject the supervenience of content facts on use 
facts (as well as on microphysical facts, and apparently on any facts other than 
the content facts themselves), so they would reject (**). 
 43.  Williamson himself appears to posit such ignorance. One relevant passage is this: 
 Since the content of the concept depends on the overall pattern, you have 
no way of making your use of a concept on a particular occasion sensitive to 
the overall pattern. Even if you did know all the details of the pattern (which 
you could not), you would still be ignorant of the manner on which they 
determined the content of the concept ( 1994 , 231–232). 
 See also Williamson ( 1994 , Section 7.4). 
 44.  Williamson ( 1994 , 230). 
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